distribution versus delegation federal grants-in-aid,.pdfVIP

Distribution versus Delegation: Federal Grants-in-Aid, Intergovernmental Policymaking Authority and Congressional Representation Pamela Clouser McCann University of Southern California Anthony M. Bertelli New York University March 22, 2015 DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION Abstract: Congress commonly uses grants-in-aid (GIA) to target funds to states for the implementation of significant domestic policies. We argue that individual MCs care about both ex ante and ex post oversight over the spending programs on which they vote, and recognize that agency costs remain insuring that their constituents maintain their distribution of funds. MCs prefer to minimize the time and effort needed to reduce such agency loss ex post, and the decentralization of implementation through GIA has an impact on the costliness of such effort . We employ a unique dataset that captures all grants-in-aid provisions included in all House and Senate bills and public laws during the 93rd-111th congresses and find evidence that: MCs are less likely to support bills as implementation becomes more decentralized when they share partisanship with the president or both political executives; and when members either share party affiliation with only their governors or with neither of these political executives, the likelihood of support rises with decentralization. Paper prepared for the 3rd Annual Southern California Law Social Science Forum. We thank Nathaniel Beck and George Krause for helpful suggestions. Mistakes remain our own. Congress cannot force the states to implement