Hegemons, Leaders and Followers A Game-Theoretic Approach to.pdf

Hegemons, Leaders and Followers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy Kjell Hausken and Thomas Plümper 96/1 Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Lothringer Str. 78 D-50677 Köln Germany Telephone 0221 / 33605-0 Fax 0221 / 33605-55 MPIFG Discussion Paper 96 / 1 E-Mail mpi@mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de ISSN 0944–2073 Home Page http: //www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de January 1996 2 MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/1 Abstract The article introduces the concept of hegemony to leadership theory, which has developed mainly as a critique of hegemonic stability theory. We argue that it makes sense to combine the two theories by introducing the concept of ‘size’ into neoliberal thinking about International Political Economy. We accept the neo- institutional hypothesis that a hegemon is not needed to provide public goods, and demonstrate with non-cooperative games how multiple leaders may jointly provide public goods. A game-theoretic model is developed illustrating with Nash equilibria the conditions under which a hegemon rationally switches from hegemony to leadership. It also shows why followers rationally switch from free-riding in their consumption of the public goods to taking part in leading, in the sense of contributing to covering the cost of the production of the public goods. The emergence of joint leadership leads to multiple equilibria in the sense of allowing fo