Locke’s Construction of the Idea of Power - Purdue University.pdf

Locke’s Construction of the Idea of Power Michael Jacovides I. The Origin of the Idea of Power In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke offers an elegant and attractive empiricist solution to the problem of how we are able to think of powers. Let me begin by quoting the account of the origin of our idea of power and intersperse some initial exegetical remarks. Locke explains his view in the first section of his chapter on power (2.21.1).1 He begins by describing the attention the mind pays to various actions and changes, beginning with “the alteration of those Simple Ideas, it observes in things without.” The mind also notes, “how one [outward object] comes to an end . . . and another begins to exist.” In addition to these external observations, the mind contemplates itself. It registers the activities of external bodies and the results of internal volitions by “reflecting . . . on what passes within it self, and observing a constant change of its Ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward Objects on the Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own choice.” These observations of changes and activities are data. The mind takes these data and infers “from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things, by like Agents, and by like ways.” After making this prediction, the mind “considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple Ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change.” This is Locke’s explanation of how we form “that Idea which we call Power.” We build the idea of power out of ideas gathered by witnessing agents causing changes. If I see a brick break a window, I acquire the idea of what the brick is doing——namely, breaking a window. By extrapolating this idea to other bricks and other times, I ge