股权结构、现金流和资本投资.ppt

Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in China Yi Zhang Peking University International Conference on Corporate Governance Shanghai March 2005 I. Introduction It has been over ten years since stock markets established in China. China stocks market has been playing a role . there exist so many listed firms committed fraud and scandal Since 1992, about 200 listed firms among 1200 have been subject to security enforcement action by China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). The ratio of firms with scandal is far above the level of other countries Motivation What contributes to firm’s scandal? Does corporate governance matter in China? Is there a sound corporate governance mechanism could prevent scandal? Does legal and economic development matter? - Is there a difference between firms in regions with various legal effectiveness? - economic development? II. Issues and Hypothesis: -Corporate governance -legal -economic -finance 1.? Corporate Governance 1.1.? ownership One of the most essential feature of the ownership of Chinese listed firms is the dominance of the largest shareholder There has no effective mechanism to monitor and restrict the large shareholders The large shareholder can expropriate the minority shareholders for private benefit 1.? Corporate Governance 1.1.? ownership Jensen(1976) Stulz (1988) H1A: As the ownership of the largest shareholder increases from zero, a firm is more likely to be associated with scandal Entrenchment of large shareholders Expropriation by large shareholder La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer (1999) La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer (2002) Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) Fan and Wong (2002) H1B: As the ownership of the largest shareholder increases over certain level, a firm is more likely to be associated with scandal 1.2? Firm Controller There is fundamental difference between state and non-state s