无标度网络博弈模型研讨.pptxVIP

Scale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the Emergence of Cooperation PRL :F. C. Santosand and J. M. Pacheco published 26 August 2005 邵中尉 PD（prisoners dilemma ） PD（prisoners dilemma ） Two men are arrested, but the police do not possess enough information for a conviction. Following the separation of the two men, the police offer both a similar deal—if one testifies against his partner (defects/betrays), and the other remains silent (cooperates/assists), the betrayer goes free and the one that remains silent receives the full one-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only one month in jail for a minor charge. If each rats out the other, each receives a three-month sentence. Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent; the decision of each is kept quiet. What should they do?? PD（prisoners dilemma ） In PD ,two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate of defect: R: mutual cooperation P: mutual defection T: a defector exploiting a cooperator S: the exploited cooperators TRPS SG (snowdrift game ) SG (snowdrift game ) Imagine two drivers on their way home that are caught in a blizzard and trapped on either side of a snowdrift. Each driver has the option to get out and start shovelling or to remain in the cozy warmth of the car. If both start shovelling each has the benefit of getting home while sharing the labour costs. However, if only one shovels both drivers still get home but the lazy bum avoids the labour costs. Nevertheless and despite the shovelling, the benefit of getting home outweighs the awkward prospects of waiting for spring to melt the obstacle. SG (snowdrift game ) In SG ,the order of P and S is exchanged : R: mutual cooperation P: mutual defection T: a defector exploiting a cooperator S: the exploited cooperators TRSP In this paper