物流英语全修改课件.docx

第11小组团队作业： 2013020401020 陈诗韵 2013020401023 柯金伶 2013020401039 郭铭芬 2013020402021 黎惠萍  Contract Design with a Dominant Retailer and a Competitive Fringe 一个主导零售商和竞争边缘的合同设计 W e show that under some conditions, quantity discounts and two-part tariffs are equivalent as mechanisms for channel coordination when an upstream firm sells its product in a downstream market that is characterized by a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe. We consider a setting in which discriminatory offers are feasible and a setting in which the same menu of options must be offered to all retailers. We find that the upstream firm’s profit in both settings is independent of whether quantity discounts or two-part tariffs are used. The implication of this finding is that the firm’s choice of contract design may turn on which one is easier to implement. 摘要 我们表明，在某些情况下，当上游企业在下游市场，其特点是主导零售商和有竞争力的边缘企业销售其产品，数量折扣计划和两部定价是等价的渠道协调机制，。我们考虑了一个歧视性的设置是可行的和一个同样的选项的设置必须提供给所有零售商。我们发现上游公司的利润均设置独立于数量折扣计划或两部定价是否使用。这一发现的含义是，契约设计的公司的选择可能打开哪一个更容易实现。 Key words: marketing； channels of distribution； competitive strategy； pricing 关键词：营销；分销渠道；竞争战略；定价 History: Received December 6, 2011; accepted October 9, 2012, by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing. Published online in Articles in Advance March 4, 2013. 1. Introduction 背景介绍 Channel coordination has been and continues to be a major focus of the literature on vertical contracting ever since the seminal works of Jeuland and Shugan (1983) and Moorthy (1987). The starting point of this literature is a recognition of the fact that each channel member’s decisions may affect other channel members’ profits, and thus a lack of coordination among these decisions can lead to lower profits for all. It follows that by ensuring that channel members’ incentives are fully aligned through its choice of contract terms, a manufacturer can either directly or indirectly(through redistributive means) increase not only its own profit but also those of its downstream partners. 渠道协调一直在发展，自