lecture23(博弈论讲义(Carnegie Mellon University)).ppt

June 20, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 23 June 20, 2003 Lecture 23 Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Incomplete Information Introduction to Static Bayesian Games Outline of Static Games of Incomplete Information Introduction to static games of incomplete information Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation of static Bayesian games Bayesian Nash equilibrium Auction Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Cournot duopoly model of incomplete information (version two) Battle of sexes with incomplete information (version one) Static (or simultaneous-move) games of complete information A set of players (at least two players) For each player, a set of strategies/actions Payoffs received by each player for the combinations of the strategies, or for each player, preferences over the combinations of the strategies All these are common knowledge among all the players. Static (or simultaneous-move) games of INCOMPLETE information Payoffs are no longer common knowledge Incomplete information means that At least one player is uncertain about some other player’s payoff function. Static games of incomplete information are also called static Bayesian games Cournot duopoly model of incomplete information (version one) A homogeneous product is produced by only two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. The quantities are denoted by q1 and q2, respectively. They choose their quantities simultaneously. The market price: P(Q)=a-Q, where a is a constant number and Q=q1+q2. Firm 1’s cost function: C1(q1)=cq1. All the above are common knowledge Cournot duopoly model of incomplete information (version one) cont’d Firm 2’s marginal cost depends on some factor (e.g. technology) that only firm 2 knows. Its marginal cost can be HIGH: cost function: C2(q2)=cHq2. LOW: cost function: C2(q2)=cLq2. Before production, firm 2 can observe the factor and know exactly which level of marginal cost is in. However, firm 1 cannot know exactly firm 2’s cost. Equivalently, it is uncertain about firm