崔志鹏电邮博弈报告.ppt

The Electronic Mail Game:  Strategic Behavior Under Almost Common Knowledge The Coordinated Attack Story Contributions of the paper The main message of this paper is that players strategic behavior under almost common knowledge may be very different from that under common knowledge. Definition of these two kind knowledge Introduce an example Demonstrate the Electronic Mail System Demonstrate the Electronic Mail System The Analysis of the Electronic Mail Game The Analysis of the Electronic Mail Game The Analysis of the Electronic Mail Game The Analysis of the Electronic Mail Game Conclusions: * * Ariel Rubinstein The American Economic Review(Jun.,1989) Presented by Cui Zhipeng Army 1 Army 2 Enemy Attack at dawn I see I see you see I see you see I see Attack at dawn or not Attack at dawn or not “Almost Common Knowledge“ VS “Common Knowledge” Common knowledge: it is common knowledge between two players 1and 2 that The played game is G, if both know that the game is G, 1 knows that 2 knows that the game is G. And 2 knows that 1 knows that the game is G, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows that the game is G. And 2 knows that 1 knows that 2 knows that the game is G and so on and so on. “Almost common knowledge”: not so on and so on, the “knows” are finite. Two players, 1 and 2, are involved in a coordination problem. Each has to choose between two actions A and B. There are two possible states of nature, a and b. Each of the states is associated with a payoff matrix as follows: The Game Ga 2 1 A A B B M M 0 0 0 0 -L -L State a, probability 1-p The Game Gb 2 A A B B 0 0 M M 0 0 -L State b, probability p 1 -L LM0, p1/2 Both 1 and 2 knows about which state are they in, state