赤字和政府债务.ppt

* * * * * * * * The traditional view is just the viewpoint embodied in the models that students learned in chapters 3 through 13 of this textbook. This viewpoint is accepted by most mainstream economists. * * * * * * If you would like to save time, you can combine the material on this slide with the material on slide 23 (other perspective #3: debt politics), as both deal with the balanced budget constraint on fiscal policy. * * * This slide and the next correspond to the case study “the Benefits of Indexed Bonds” that closes Chapter 15 (see pp.451-452). It might be worth taking a moment to help your students understand why inflation risk is an undesirable thing. It’s also a good idea to help your students understand why we can infer the expected inflation rate from the difference between the yields on standard and inflation-indexed bonds of the same maturity. A simple example might help: Suppose the inflation-indexed Treasury bond pays 3 percent after inflation, while a standard Treasury bond with the same maturity pays 5 percent. We can infer that the market expects 2 percent inflation during the term of the bond. If people expected less than two percent inflation, then the non-indexed bond would have a higher real return than the indexed bond, so everyone would try to buy the non-indexed bond. But this would drive up its price, and drive down its return, until the difference between the returns on the two bonds just equals expected inflation. * This graph presents the yields on 10-year constant maturity non-indexed and inflation-indexed U.S. Treasury bonds. The implied expected rate of inflation is simply the difference between the non-indexed (i.e. nominal) and indexed (i.e. real) bond yields. Expected inflation was 1.51% at the beginning of 2003. It was as high as 2.7% (nearly double the 1/2003 figure) in March 2005 and again in May 2006. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Obtained from: /fred2/ * * * * slide *