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Good Capitalists Stop Disasters by Ilan Kelman 2 September 2003 The blackout, and commentary on it, have raised the issues of complexity and scale of the infrastructure systems we create. In particular, the immense size of the energy production and energy transport systems produces an interlinked, continental-wide network which lacks appropriate resiliency and redundancy. These traits stem directly from the economic and social models which have led us to create these monsters. Contemporary society wants all the energy-related conveniences with the immediate economic costs being low and with the true and long-term costs being far removed, in space and time. Environmental, aesthetic, and social costs are examples. They are hidden from us through distant energy generation facilities justified economically by the costs (falsely) discounted into the future. If, however, economies of scale and distancing a products true costs from the products users are the most important aspects of our energy system, then centralised structures and systems will be supported. Thus, we build huge systems and monoliths where few people see them, such as nuclear power plants, large dams, and vast, towering wind farms in the isolated countryside. We then need immense networks and systems to get the energy from source to use. In addition to energy, we generate increased complexity, increased interconnectedness, and increased vulnerability. In January 1998 in eastern Canada, these issues became evident when an ice storm brought down power lines and power line towers. Millions of people had no power for days. During, and in the aftermath of, that crisis, a popular suggestion was to bury power cables to reduce the systems vulnerability. Cables underground would not need supporting towers and could not be broken by the accumulation of ice. A few weeks later, right on cue, Aucklands buried power cables started frying in a heat wave. Four cables brought power to the centre of Ne