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INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 信息不对称、融资结构和金融中介 HAYNE E. LELAND AND DAVID H. PYLE** INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY NUMEROUS MARKETS ARE characterized by informational differences between buyers and sellers. In financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced. Borrowers typically know their collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude better than do lenders; entrepreneurs possess inside information about their own projects for which they seek financing. 买卖双方之间的信息不对称存在于许多市场。在金融市场中，信息不对称表现得尤为明显。借款人通常比贷款人更为了解他们的抵押品、能力及品德；企业家拥有他们寻求融资的项目的“内部”信息。 Lenders would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers. But moral hazard hampers the direct transfer of information between market participants. Borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics, nor entrepreneurs about their projects, since there may be substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities. And verification of true characteristics by outside parties may be costly or impossible. 贷款人将从了解借款人的真实特征中受益。但道德风险阻碍了市场参与者之间信息的直接传递。由于夸大好的特征会获得丰厚回报，我们不能指望借款人和企业家对他们的特点和项目完全坦诚。而外部当事人对借款人和企业项目的真实特征的核查可能是成本高昂或不可能的。 Without information transfer, markets may perform poorly. Consider the financing of projects whose quality is highly variable. While entrepreneurs know the quality of their own projects, lenders cannot distinguish among them. Market value, therefore, must reflect average project quality. If the market were to place an average value greater than average cost on projects, the potential supply of low quality projects may be very large, since entrepreneurs could foist these upon an uninformed market (retaining little or no equity) and make a sure profit. But this argues that the average quality is likely to be low, with the consequence that even projects which are known (by the entrepreneur) to merit financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low average proje