CPS296.3GameTheory.pptVIP

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CPS 296.3 Game Theory;Risk attitudes;Decreasing marginal utility;Maximizing expected utility;Different possible risk attitudes under expected utility maximization;What is utility, anyway?;Normal-form games ;Rock-paper-scissors;“Chicken”;Rock-paper-scissors – Seinfeld variant;Dominance;Prisoner’s Dilemma;“Should I buy an SUV?” ;Mixed strategies;Checking for dominance by mixed strategies ;Iterated dominance;Iterated dominance: path (in)dependence;Two computational questions for iterated dominance;Zero-sum games revisited;Best-response strategies;Minimax (minmax, maxmin) strategies;Computing a minimax strategy for rock-paper-scissors;Minimax theorem [von Neumann 1927];Solving for minimax strategies using linear programming;General-sum games;Nash equilibrium [Nash 50];Nash equilibria of “chicken”;Nash equilibria of “chicken”…;The presentation game;The “equilibrium selection problem”;Some properties of Nash equilibria;How hard is it to compute one (any) Nash equilibrium?;What if we want to compute a Nash equilibrium with a specific property?;Search-based approaches (for 2 players);Correlated equilibrium [Aumann 74];A correlated equilibrium for “chicken”;A nonzero-sum variant of rock-paper-scissors (Shapley’s game [Shapley 64]);Solving for a correlated equilibrium using linear programming (n players!);Extensive-form games ;Extensive-form games with perfect information;Backward induction;A limitation of backward induction;Conversion from extensive to normal form;Converting the first game to normal form;Subgame perfect equilibrium;Imperfect information;A poker-like game;Subgame perfection and imperfect information;Subgame perfection and imperfect information…;Computing equilibria in the extensive form;Repeated games;Finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma;Modified Prisoner’s Dilemma;Another modified Prisoner’s Dilemma;Infinitely repeated games;Infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma;Folk theorem(s);Feasibility;Enforceability;Computing a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player repeated

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