Coordination Game Analysis through Penalty Scheme in Freight Intermodal Service英文文献资料.docVIP

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Coordination Game Analysis through Penalty Scheme in Freight Intermodal Service英文文献资料.doc

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Coordination Game Analysis through Penalty Scheme in Freight Intermodal Service英文文献资料

HindawiPublishingCorporation MathematicalProblemsinEngineering Volume2012,ArticleID247509,14pages doi:10.1155/2012/247509 ResearchArticle Coordination GameAnalysisthroughPenalty SchemeinFreightIntermodal Service JianLiu,JianningYu,andYinzhenLi SchoolofTra?candTransportation,LanzhouJiaotongUniversity,Lanzhou730070,China Correspondence shouldbeaddressedtoJianLiu,liujianlz@ Received10May2012;Revised14August2012;Accepted 15August2012 Academic Editor:WuhongWang Copyright q2012JianLiuetal. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use,distribution, andreproduction in anymedium,providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited. We study coordination mechanisms through penalty schemes to cooperate the behavior of two ?rmsassuccessive segmentcarrierstomaketransportplanseparateinfreightintermodal market. Based on the di?erent cost structure and service level constraint to two ?rms, we compare the decision making in two possible decision systems, that is, centralized system and decentralized system.Inacentralizedsystem—the?rstbestcaseasabenchmarkiscontrastedwithdecentralized system. Inthedecentralized system, aStackelberg gamemodel isformulated between two?rms. Some discordant decisions would be made by ?rm I’s overestimate motivation and ?rm II’s undersupply motivation. Our primary objective is to design penalty schemes to coordinate the interactions for two ?rms. The study shows in a decentralized system, setting suitable penalty schemes can coordinate the two ?rms’ decision. We also study the feasible range of penalty parameters, and some important managerial insights are then deduced. In the end, anumerical example is provided to verify the validity of results, some concluding remarks are presented subsequently. 1.Introduction Overthepastdecades,theincreasingimportanceofinternationallogisticshasforcedmany ?rmstoconsiderutilizingintermodalismtosubstantiallydecreaselogisticscosts.Intermodal freightt