Rational expectations and the Cournot-Theocharis problem 外文参考文献.docVIP

RATIONALEXPECTATIONSANDTHE COURNOT-THEOCHARISPROBLEM ¨ TONUPUU Received18April2006;Accepted1May2006 Indynamic models ineconomics, often“rational expectations” areassumed. Theseare meanttoshowthattheagentscancorrectlyforeseetheresultoftheirownandtheother agents’actions. Inthispaper,itisshownthatthiscannothappeninasimpleoligopoly modelwithalineardemandfunctionandconstantmarginalcosts.“Naiveexpectations,” thatis,whereeachagentassumestheotheragentstoretaintheirpreviousperiodaction, areshown toresult ina2-period cycle.However,adapting totheobserved periodicity alwaysdoublestheactualresultingpe