内部人交易与公司治理毕业论文.docx

内部人交易与公司治理——来自公司董、监、高二级市场交易的证据摘要上市公司的内部人（董事、监事、高管）作为公司的直接控制者，掌握着公司经营决策的关键信息，其行为与决策影响公司价值和投资者利益。本文对公司内部人是否利用了其掌握的内部信息进行二级市场交易进行了验证，并从公司治理的视角研究内部人交易的信息披露及时性，分析了不同最终控制权属性下（国企和民企）公司治理机制的不同。本文以上市公司内部人交易披露的及时性作为内部人是否利用其信息优势做交易的代理变量，验证了内部人交易确实在一定程度上基于其信息优势。披露延迟加剧了股东和经营者之间的信息不对称，基金持股比例高、超额聘请独立董事有助于促进内部人交易信息的及时披露，因机构投资者有动机和能力干预公司治理，董事会的独立性越强则其越在公司治理结构中越能发挥积极的作用。在国企和民企这两种不同的微观环境下，公司治理机制发挥作用的方式有所不同。超额聘请独立董事对于国企公司治理的改善有更明显的作用，基金持股对于民企公司治理的改善有更显著的作用。关键词：内部人交易；信息不对称；披露延迟；公司治理；控制权属性Insider Trading and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China’s Listed FirmsAbstractInsiders, who directly control firms, have complete and critical information concerning corporate decisions. What’s more, their decisions influence firm value and the welfare of investors. This paper looks into whether insiders trade on the basis of the specific information they have, explore the disclosure of insider trading from the perspective of corporate governance, and discuss the different governance mechanism in SOEs and Non-SOEs. The disclosure delay of insider trading is a good proxy for whether insiders trade according to inside information. The empirical result shows that they actually do. Since disclosure delay exacerbate the information asymmetry between shareholders and management, corporate governance practices such as having institutions as shareholders, employing more independent directors, etc. play an effective role. That is because block holderssuch as mutual funds have both the incentive and ability to improve corporate governance and the independent role of directors can benefit the shareholders of the firm.This paper also finds that the mechanisms of corporate governance seem a little bit different in SOEs and Non-SOEs.The employment of more independent directors does more good to SOEs than to Non-SOEs. Mutual fund can be an effective supervisor to Non-SOEs. Moreover, the governance of Non-SOEs leaves much to be desired due to the high concentration of shares in Non-SOEs.Key Words:Insider Trading,