Language-Based Information-Flow Security-英文文献.pdf

IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 21, NO. 1, JANUARY 2003 1 Language-Based Information-Flow Security Andrei Sabelfeld and Andrew C. Myers Abstract— Current standard security practices do not pro- untrusted, possibly malicious hosts or code, making assurance vide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a of confidentiality still more difficult. computing system satisfies important security policies such as The standard way to protect confidential data is (discre- confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through tionary) access control: some privilege is required in order to the attacker’s observations of system output; this policy regulates access files or objects containing the confidential data. Access information flow. control checks place restrictions on the release of information Conventional security mechanisms such as access control but not its propagation. Once information is released from and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of its container, the accessing program may, through error or information-flow policies. Recently, a promising new approach malice, improperly transmit the information in some form. It is has been developed: the use of programming-language tech- niques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. unrealistic to assume that all the programs in a large computing In this article we survey the past three decades of research on s