基于序贯博弈模型的发电商竞价策略分析-电网技术.pdf

32 卷 14 期 电 网 技 术 Vol. 32 No.14 2008 年7 月 Power System Technology Jul. 2008 文章编号：1000-3673 （2008 ）14-0085-05 中图分类号：F407.2 文献标识码：A 学科代码：790 625 基于序贯博弈模型的发电商竞价策略分析 清清，周建中，莫 莉，张勇传 （华中科技大学 水电与数字化工程学院，湖北省 武汉市 430074 ） Analysis on Generators Bidding Strategy Based on Sequential Game Model LI Qing-qing，ZHOU Jian-zhong，MO Li，ZHANG Yong-chuan （College of Hydroelectric and Digitalization Engineering ，Huazhong University of Science and Technology， Wuhan 430074，Hubei Province，China ） ABSTRACT: According to the bidding process between 过程和各电厂决策的影响，并得出在电力系统处于不同供需 hydropower stations and fossil-fuel generating plants in 状态时，应引导形成不同类型竞价市场的结论。算例验证了 electricity market and by use of Stackelberg sequential game 结论的正确性。 model, the modeling and analysis on asynchronous 关键词：序贯博弈；Stackelberg 模型；不完全信息；优先政 decision-making process among power generation enterprises 策；电力市场 under complete information condition are conducted, and the optimal power generation strategy of each power generation 0 引言 enterprise is solved. Comparing the bidding results by 随着电力能源的开发，我国电力行业逐渐从供 Stackelberg game model under complete information with that 不应求状态过渡到供需平衡状态，发电侧开始向大 by Sta