专利连结制度与逆向和解协议 - 云林科技大学.pptVIP

謝謝聆聽Q＆A * * * SCM v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1193, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981): “The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented art. When the patented product . . . . succeeds in engulfing a large section of a preexisting product market, the patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash.” * The initial view of the US courts was that the conflict must be resolved by elevating IP rights over antitrust concerns. This view was built on the concept that IP law gives a sort of “immunity” from antitrust. This view prevailed until the 1930s. These quotes here are from a US Supreme Court has that gives a flavor of how this view dealt with the IP – antitrust interface. Let me describe that case briefly. The case was Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) Patent pool among competing manufacturers Established to settle litigation among manufacturers of “float spring tooth harrows” Each firm assigned patents to National Harrow Company, which licensed technology back Each firm had to adhere to price schedule (price fixing) Each firm limited to use the technology that it started with Supreme Court held that there was no antitrust violation because patents gave right to condition license Logic: Since a patentee need not license at all (it can chose to use technology itself), patentee can put any condition on license. Note: Brazilian law allows for compulsory licenses where invention not commercialized. ALLOWED CONDUCT THAT WAS MANIFESTLY BAD FOR ECONOMY – PRICE FIXING * Later, as both Congress and the courts focused on the perceived relationship between IP and the restriction of economic activity, the prevailing view came to be that the role of antitrust was to ensure that the competi