public-key encryption schemes with auxiliary inputs（公钥加密方案与辅助输入）.pdfVIP

Public-Key Encryption Schemes with Auxiliary Inputs Yevgeniy Dodis , Shafi Goldwasser , Yael Kalai , Chris Peikert , and Vinod Vaikuntanathan New York University MIT and Weizmann Institute Microsoft Research Georgia Institute of Technology IBM Research Abstract. We construct public-key cryptosystems that remain secure even when the adversary is given any computationally uninvertible function of the secret key as auxiliary input (even one that may reveal the secret key information- theoretically). Our schemes are based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the Learning with Errors (LWE) problems. As an independent technical contribution, we extend the Goldreich-Levin theo- rem to provide a hard-core (pseudorandom) value over large fields. 1 Introduction Modern cryptographic algorithms are designed under the assumption that keys are per- fectly secret and independently chosen for the algorithm at hand. Still, in practice, in- formation about secret keys does get compromised for a variety of reasons, including side-channel attacks on the physical implementation of the cryptographic algorithm, or the use of the same secret key or the same source of randomness for keys across several applications. In recent years, starting with the works of [5, 15, 18], a new goal has been set within the theory of cryptography community to build a general theory of physical security against large classes of side channel attacks. A large body of work has accumulated by now i