secure implementation in allotment economies（在分配国家安全的实现）.pdfVIP

Secure implementation in allotment economies ∗ Olivier Bochet †and Toyotaka Sakai ‡ August 3, 2007 Abstract An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no “bad” Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game (Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2007). We study this implementability notion in al- lotment economies with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991). We show that the equal division rule is the unique symmetric and securely implementable rule. The uniform rule, which is central in the literature, is not securely imple- mentable, though it is symmetric and strategy-proof. We next investigate the structure of the set of Nash equilibria of the direct revelation game associated with the uniform rule. We show that any “bad” Nash equilibrium is blocked by a credible coalitional deviation that realizes the true uniform allocation, while any “good” Nash equilibrium is robust against any coalitional deviation. Thus the impossibility of securely implementing the uniform rule can be resolved by allowing pre-play communication among players. Keywords: Secure implementation, Strategy-proofness, Uniform rule, Nash implementation, Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, Single-peaked prefer- ence, Fair allocation. JEL codes: C72, D63, D61, C78, D71. ∗The authors thank Ryusuke Shinohara and Takuma Wakayama for helpful advices. Part of this paper was written when O. Bochet was visiting Yokohama National University. The visit was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) which is gratefully acknowl