Chapter_06_政治经济学.pptVIP

CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL ECONOMY Direct Democracy-Unanimity Rules Feasibility of Unanimity Rules Reaching equilibrium Practical problems Strategic behavior time to reach equilibrium Direct Democracy-Majority Voting Rules Majority voting rule – one more than half of the voters must favor a measure for it to be approved Direct Democracy-Majority Voting Rules Voting Paradox – community preferences can be inconsistent even though individual’s preferences are consistent Agenda Manipulation – process of organizing order of votes to ensure a favorable outcome Cycling – when paired voting on more than two possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being reached Graphing Preferences Practical Importance of Double-peaked Preferences Availability of private substitutes Issues ranked along single dimension Direct Democracy - The Median Voter Theorem Direct Democracy - Logrolling I Direct Democracy - Logrolling II Direct Democracy - Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem “Reasonable” collective decision-making criteria It can produce a decision whatever the configuration of voters preferences It must be able to rank all possible outcomes It must be responsive to individuals’ preferences It must be consistent Independence of irrelevant alternatives Dictatorship ruled out Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem All conceivable voting schemes have some potential for being unfair or producing a paradoxical result Meaning of theorem consistent rule not necessarily impossible to find, but cannot be guaranteed Buchanan’s critique Use of social welfare functions Representative Democracy - Elected Politicians Implications of the Median Voter Model Two-party systems tend to be stable Replacement of direct referenda by representative system has no effect on outcomes Other Factors Influencing Voting Single-dimensional rankings Ideology Personality Leadership Decision to vote Representative Democracy-Public Employees Function of bureaucrats Goals of bureaucrats Niskanen’s Model of Bureaucracy