企业成长政治关联还是能力建设.PDF

企业成长：政治关联还是能力建设∗ 杨其静 “站着太辛苦，很多人就不站着了”——姜文 《大周末Hotspot》 ） 摘要：与 Cournot/Stackelberg 模型不同，本文强调现实中的企业不会消极地将自己的命运托 付给市场需求和其他企业，因为它们不仅会努力对内进行能力建设，而且也会对外寻求政府 帮助，以便获得某种竞争优势。然而，资源有限的企业必须在能力建设和政治关联之间进行 权衡。借助一个产品品质纵向差异竞争模型中，我们阐明，如果政府被授予的财力和处置权 很大，而提升和维护产品品质优势却很困难，那么，企业将热衷于政治关联而不是能力建设， 尤其是当那些无力消费高品质产品的低端消费群体比例很大时。同时，我们还发现，如果一 个社会收入分配使得贫富差距严重且低端消费群体非常大，同时一些跨国公司占据了高端市 场，那么，本土企业就很可能甘愿沦为低端行业或者产品的生产者，并加剧对政治关联的渴 望。因此，在一个政府掌握大量资源而又缺乏监督的社会中，很可能形成“政治关联盛行- 收入分配不公正-企业能力缺乏-政治关联更加盛行…”的恶性循环。总之，这些研究有利于 我们更深入地剖析中国发展模式的利与弊。 关键词：企业成长 政治关联 能力建设 品质差异 成本优势 The Growth of Enterprises: Political Connections or Capability- Building Abstract: Different from the Cournot / Stackelberg model, this paper emphasizes that the actual enterprises will not negatively entrust their fate to market demand and other enterprises, because they always try to not only build their own internal capacity, but also seek government helps in order to obtain some competitive advantage. However, they are constrained by limited resources and must balance between capacity-building and political connections. Based on a vertical-difference model, we sate that if the government controls a great amount of economic resources and is granted great discretion, and it is very difficult for the enterprises to upgrade and maintain the advantages of product quality, then, enterprises will be keen to political association rather than capacity-building, especially when proportion of low-end consumer groups is very large. We also find that if the income distribution is seriously unfair and the portion of the poor is very large, while some multinational companies account for the high-end market, then, domestic enterprises are likely to become low-quality producers, and increase the desire for political relevance. Thus, in a society whose government