a study of independent director’s reputation incentive mechanism based on the principal-agent theory独立董事的声誉的研究基于委托代理理论的激励机制.pdfVIP

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a study of independent director’s reputation incentive mechanism based on the principal-agent theory独立董事的声誉的研究基于委托代理理论的激励机制.pdf

a study of independent director’s reputation incentive mechanism based on the principal-agent theory独立董事的声誉的研究基于委托代理理论的激励机制

iBusiness, 2009, 1, 34-39 doi:10.4236/ib.2009.11006 Published Online September 2009(/journal/ib) A Study of Independent Director’s Reputation Incentive Mechanism Based on the Principal-Agent Theory 1 2 Xiaoning LV , Yang LIU 1 Dalian Jiaotong University, Dalian, China 2Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China Abstract: This paper applies principal-agent theory to research into the incentive compatibility pro

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