经理人超额、任人唯亲的董事会文化和公司治理.PDFVIP

经理人超额薪酬、任人唯亲的董事会文化和公司治理 －来自我国上市公司的证据 * 郑志刚 孙娟娟 中国人民大学财政金融学院 中国财政金融政策研究中心 通讯作者：郑志刚 通讯地址：中国人民大学财政金融学院（100872 ） 联系电话： Email： zhengzhigang@; zhzhigang@. 作者简介： 郑志刚，经济学博士（北大光华），中国人民大学财政金融学院教授，博士生导师，应用金 融系副主任。2007 年4 月至2008 年4 月在UCLA 进行学术访问。研究领域为公司治理、企 业理论、微观经济理论等。在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《世界经济》 和《金融研究》等中文期刊和《Actual Problems of Economics》等SSCi 期刊发表论文数十篇。 同时担任《经济研究》、《世界经济》和《金融研究》等学术期刊的匿名审稿人。曾获北京大 学优秀博士学位论文和第二届黄达－蒙代尔经济学奖等奖励和荣誉。孙娟娟，中国人民大学 财政金融学院。 Excessive Executive Compensations, Cronyism of Board Culture and Corporate Governance Zhigang ZHENG Juanjuan Sun School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872 Abstract: This paper explores the causes and economic consequence of excessive executive compensations from the perspective of cronyism of board culture. Based on the evidence from China’s listed firms, we offer support to the argument by Brick et al. (2006) that the culture characteristic of the director board is one of the key determinants of the independence and effectiveness of the board and provide more convincing evidence that cronyism of board culture would lead to excessive executive compensations by controlling for the endogeneity concern in the previous literature. The uniqueness of institutional background of China’s listed firms makes us further investigate the potential channel to refrain excessive executive compensations. That is to disperse compensations to the directors (chairman) through the investors, instead of the listed firms, which is an important approach to enhance the independence and effectiveness of the board in corporate governance practice. Keywords: excessive ex