世俗是否为自相有—清辨知识论探析.doc

Are Phenomena Established From Their Own Entity Conventionally? —Exploring Bhāvivekas Epistemology Su-an Lin This paper discusses the relationship between language and the ontological status of phenomena, in the sense that if everything must be certified in and of itself, then the concept of language would be meaningful. In other words, if a thing does not exist, is it possible for language to refer to it? I start with Tsong-kha-pas viewing Bhāviveka as one who asserts, things are established from their own entity conventionally, with reference to Bhāvivekas works on the topic of universals (sāmānya), to explore Bhāvivekas own standpoint to determine whether there is evidence to support this assertion. In Tsong-kha-pas interpretation of Mādhyamika, the major difference between Prasa?gika and the Svātantrika school following Bhāviveka is the assertion in Svātantrika that everything has its own entity (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa, *svalak?a?asiddha) from the aspect of conventional truth. In Tsong-kha-pas work, The Essence of Eloquence: A Treatise on the Differentiation of Interpretable and Definitive Meanings, he interprets Bhāviveka as saying that all phenomena exist by way of their own character: In the Praj?āpradīpa, [Bhāviveka criticized his opponents assertion of the non-existence of the imputational nature, saying:] “If the character of the imputational nature which is expressed as the apprehended [character] in mental formulations and words does not exist, that would be a deprecation of the existent (dngos po) because of being a deprecation of that expressed by mental formulations and words [because the existence is established by mental formulations and words]. This explains that calling the imputational nature an imputational character non-nature is a deprecation [also] of the other-powered as being without a character nature. Hence, it is an explanation that [Bhāviveka asserts] other-powered natures have a character nature [i.e., they also exist by