审计频度、处罚力度与审计效果.pdfVIP

审计频度、审计处罚和审计效果 【内容摘要】审计的最终目的是促使被审计单位抑制其机会主义行为。然而，令人担忧 的是，被审计单位财政收支或者财务收支的真实、合法和效益水平并没有显著提高，甚至还 有下降趋势。本文建立一个解释这一现象的理论框架，并且采用博弈分析予以验证。审计频 度通过预期路径和预防路径对审计效果发挥作用，审计处罚通过威慑路径和心理路径发挥作 用，审计频度和审计处罚的使用都有一个合理限度，审计频度和审计处罚需要相互协同地对 审计效果发挥作用。优化审计技术以提高审计频度和提高审计处罚执行率是我国政府审计 目 前提高审计效果的主要途径。 【关键词】审计频度，审计处罚，审计效果，审计质量，审计博弈分析 Audit Frequency, Audit Punish and Audit Effectiveness zhengshiqiao Nanjing Auditing University Abstract: The purpose of audit is to restrain the opportunism of agent. But the issue to make people worry is that the opportunism of agent do not reduce. Why? This paper establish a theory frame to explain this phenomenon, and use game analysis to test the theory frame. By theory analysis, we get such results: audit frequency boost audit effectiveness by anticipation road and prevent road, audit punish boost audit effectiveness by deterrent road and psychology road, audit frequency and audit punish should be used synergistically and within some range. Game analysis support our theoretical analysis. Optimization of audit technology and strengthen the implement of audit punish are main approach to enhance audit effectiveness. Key words: Audit Frequency ，Audit Punish ，Audit Effectiveness, Audit Quality, Game Analysis 作者信息 郑石桥 （1964— ），男，汉族，湖南耒阳人，南京审计学院国际审计学院教授、博士生 导师，主要研究领域是审计理论与方法。 Email:zhengshiqiao@163.com 电话025 地址：江苏南京市浦口区江浦街道雨山西路 86 号 邮编：211815