security of the bennett-brassard quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks安全bennett-brassard量子密钥分发协议集体攻击.pdfVIP

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security of the bennett-brassard quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks安全bennett-brassard量子密钥分发协议集体攻击.pdf

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security of the bennett-brassard quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks安全bennett-brassard量子密钥分发协议集体攻击

Algorithms 2009, 2, 790-807; doi:10.3390/a2020790 OPEN ACCESS algorithms ISSN 1999-4893 /journal/algorithms Article Security of the Bennett-Brassard Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Collective Attacks Michel Boyer , Ran Gelles and Tal Mor ´ ´ ´ ´ Departement IRO, Universite de Montreal, CP 6128 Succ. Centre-Ville, Montreal H3C 3J7, Canada Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel E-mails: (boyer@iro.umontreal.ca); (talmo@cs.technion.ac.il) Alphabetical authors order. Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: gelles@cs.technion.ac.il Received: 16 October 2008; in revised form: 17 April 2009 / Accepted: 7 May 2009 / Published: 3 June 2009 Abstract: The theoretical Quantum Key-Distribution scheme of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) has been proven secure against very strong attacks including the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Though the latter are the most general attacks, collective attacks are much easier to analyze, yet, they are conjectured to be as informative to the eavesdropper. Thus, collective attacks are likely to be useful in the analysis of many theoretical and practical schemes that are still lacking a proof of security, including practical BB84 schemes. We show how powerful tools developed in previous works for proving security against the joint attack, are simpliﬁed when applied to the security of BB84 against collective attacks whilst providing the same bounds on leaked information and the same error thr