委托代理关系下监督强度与激励机制设计.docVIP

武开,张慧颖. 委托代理关系下监督强度与激励机制设计[J]. 系统工程,2016,34(07):68-72 委托代理关系下监督强度与激励机制设计 武开1,2 ， 张慧颖1 （1.天津大学管理与经济学部，天津 300072；2.天津科技大学经管学院，天津 300222） 摘 要：已有的实证研究表明，以产出为标准的薪酬激励机制并不能防止代理人不作为或谋私利，应对代理人实施有效监督。本文在委托代理理论框架下，将监督强度作为可以调节的变量融入激励机制中，分析监督强度变化对代理人产出分享和努力程度的影响，并比较了将监督结果分别用于奖励和惩罚时激励机制设计的异同。文章结论完善了委托代理框架下的激励理论，对代理人薪酬契约的合理设计提供理论指导，在提高代理人努力程度方面具有现实意义。 关键词：监督强度；激励机制；委托代理理论；负激励 中图分类号：F244 文献标识码： Supervisory Intensity and Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agency Relationship WU Kai1,2, ZHANG Hui-ying1 (1. College of Management and Economics，Tianjin University，Tianjin 300072; 2. School of Economic and Management, Tianjin University of Science and Technology, Tianjin 300222) Abstract：Compensative incentive that is based on output can improve agents effort, but actual results of enterprise indicate that single compensative incentive does not prevent agent from omission or self-serving, so it is necessary to conduct effective supervision on agent. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper integrates the supervisory intensity that can be adjusted as a variable into incentive mechanism, and study the impact of supervisory intensity on sharing of output and effort degree about agents. It compares the similarities and differences between the incentive mechanism design, when the results of supervisory intensity are used to reward and punishment. The conclusions improve incentive theory under principal-agent frame, and provide theoretical guidance for the rational design of remuneration contract to agents. It has practical significance in improving efforts of agents. Key words：supervisory intensity；incentive mechanism； principal-agent theory； negative incentive现代企业制度强调所有权与经营权分离，委托人与代理人追求各自利益最大化导致目标冲突。代理人工作是投入、产出的转化过程，投入体力和脑力劳动，企业得到产出，委托人希望代理人付出更多努力，更多努力意味着代理人要付出更多的私人成本。薪酬激励是委托人规避风险，提高代理人努力程度的常见措施，委托人面临着一个基本问题：激励契约如何综合体现代理人的产出和劳动投入。 1 文献综述 现代企业制度中的股东和董事会、董事会和管理层、管理层和员工之间是签订各类契约，形成委托代理关系。传统观点认为，信息不对称时委托人不能完全获取代理人努力程度,最优激励契约应让代理人分享一部分产出[1]。通过产出评价代理人才能，易于委托人聘用高水平的代理人[2][3]。当工