Horgan And Tienson Connectionism And The Philosophy Of Psychology Chap1英文文献.pdf

This excerpt from Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Terence E. Horgan and John Tienson. © 1996 The MIT Press. is provided in screen-viewable form for personal use only by members of MIT CogNet. Unauthorized use or dissemination of this information is expressly forbidden. If you have any questions about this material, please contact cognetadmin@cognet.mit.edu. Chapter 1 ~ Overview lntroductio n and as a rival to the standard Connectionism arosevery rapidly in the 1980s - computer based approach to cognitive science. Connectionism quickly attracted a great deal of attention among philosophers , largely because it suggeststhe possibility of an alternative to the conception of mind on the model of the modern digital computer {the so-called computer metaphor )- a conception that had become prominent in thinking about the mind , both popular and philosophical , with the advent of the . field of artificial intelligence in the 1950s on connectionism and on the reasons it rose to By reflecting , prominence when it did , we have been led to a view of cognition and cognitive processing that is significantly different from familiar views of cognition , and also from the views of other philosophers who have reflected on connectionism . We believe that human (and other natural ) cognition is too rich and flexible to be simulated by computer programs . Hence the model of the mind must be abandoned. , computer However , this very richness of cognition requires mental representations that are syntactically structured