国有企业高管权力丶薪酬激励与企业投资.doc

国有企业高管权力丶薪酬激励与企业投资 汕头大学硕士学位论文国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资姓名：袁长生申请学位级别：硕士专业：会计学指导教师：何文标2009-11-30 汕头大学硕士研究生毕业论文 国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资 摘 要 我国的国有上市公司存在投资决策非效率化，包括过度投资或者投资不足。在两类非效率投资中，过度投资比较明显。两类非效率投资都会影响企业绩效、降低企业价值、不利于股东财富最大化。选用我国沪深A股上市公司2005-2008年的数据作为样本，检验结果是：过度投资规模大于投资不足规模，该结论不受终级控制人性质影响。地方国有企业中高管薪酬激励与过度投资显著正相关关系；在其它性质国有企业水平时，则二者没有发现有显著正相关关系。所有类型国有企业中，用任期代表高管权力与高管薪酬显著正相关。我国国有上市公司高管权力过大，是导致过度投资的一个原因，权力结构问题是代理成本的一个方面。综合分析高管权力、薪酬激励对资本投资，最终证实契约失效，可能不在契约本身，而在于契约之外的权力约束机制。 关键词： 过度投资； 投资不足； 高管权力； 高管薪酬 III 汕头大学硕士研究生毕业论文 国有企业高管权力、薪酬激励与企业投资 ABSTRACT There are many non-efficiency investment decisions, including the over-investment or under-investment in China#039;s state-owned listed companies,. In the two types of non-efficient investments, over-investment is more relatively clear. Two types of non-efficiency investments will affect the business performance and lower enterprise value, which do harm to shareholder wealth. Selected companies in China in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed data for the year 2005-2008 as samples, test results are: the number of over-investment samples is less than the number of sample companies 0f under-investment, but the over-investment is larger than the scale of under-investment, the conclusion is proved in all kind of State-Owned Enterprises . There is a significant positive correlation between over-investment incentive and executive compensation in Local state-owned enterprises; the nature of state-owned enterprises in other levels, then the difference was not found to have a significant positive correlation. All types of state-owned enterprises, with a term of executive power and executive compensation on behalf of a significant positive correlation. China#039;s state-owned listed company executives too much power, is one of the reasons leading to over-investment, the power structure is one aspect of agency costs. A comprehensive analysis of executive power, pay in