[英语学习]Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets.pdfVIP

Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets Kyle Bagwell Robert W. Staiger Stanford and NBER Stanford and NBER October 14, 2009 Abstract We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive envi- ronments featuring Örm-delocation e§ects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the integrated-market monopolistic competition settings where these e§ects have been identiÖed, we show that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the ine¢ ciency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive mar- kets. Furthermore, and again as in the perfectly competitive benchmark case, we show that the principle of reciprocity is e¢ ciency enhancing, as it serves to ìundoîthe terms-of-trade driven ine¢ ciency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral trade policies. Our results therefore indicate that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements applies to a broader set of market structures than previously thought. We thank Richard Baldwin, Gene Grossman, Giovanni Maggi, Ralph Ossa and seminar participants at Princeton, the Princeton IES Summer Workshop 2009 and the WTO for very useful comments. 1 Introduction A central question in the study of commercial policy is why governments form international trade agreements. Answers to this question provide the foundation from which to evaluate and interpret the design of trade agreements in light of the underlying ìproblemsîthat they exist to solve. An established literature argues that governments have a reason to form a trade agreement wh