[文学]performance and completeness in repeated inter firm relationships.pdf

Submission ID Number: 13335 PERFORMANCE AND COMPLETENESS IN REPEATED INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING ABSTRACT We analyze factors determining contractual completeness in distribution channel relationships and how they influence performance. We argue that investing in completing the franchise contract is profitable when contractual hazards are high, as in the presence of asset specificity and reputational capital. We also claim that contracts cannot be completed without having experienced different problems and contingencies arising from former exchanges. We evaluate these hypotheses using a treatment regression model and an original sample of 74 franchise contracts. Analysis of our data broadly supports our hypotheses except for the influence of franchisor’s reputation. Results suggest that completeness is profitable only when relevant contractual hazards are dealt with. Finally, contractual learning seems to be as important as other production factors which become the strategic resources of the firm. Keywords: Franchising; Completeness; Inter-firm relationship; Performance; Retailing. 1 Submission ID Number: 13335 PERFORMANCE AND COMPLETENESS IN REPEATED INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS: THE CASE OF FRANCHISING INTRODUCTION Literature on conflict management acknowledges that conflict is ubiquitous (Bradford, Stringfellow Weitz, 2004). Franchised distribution channels are no exception and many papers have highlighted different franchisor-franchisee conflicts (Dant, Kaufmann Paswan, 1992; Lafontaine, 1992; Lal, 1990; Rubin