哈佛Ariel Pakes实证产业组织ps42009.pdfVIP

Ec2610 (Industrial Organization) - Problem Set IV Ariel Pakes and Michael Sinkinson. Due December 11th I Dynamic Games We consider Örst a Markov Perfect game with symmetric information, and then the analogue when there is asymetric information using the Applied Markov Equilibrium dynamic game analogue of the Self ConÖrming concept. You will not be estimating this model, but you will formulate it and discuss several issues that it confronts. There are two Örms in an industry that produce an identical durable good. For each period, the Örms face uncertain demand, and choose a quantity at the beginning of the 0 period to supply to the market, q for f 2f1;2g. The q s can only be chosen at a small f number of values q ;:::q . The Örms then produces the good at constant marginal cost 1 max (c + ) in that period. The term is a period-speciÖc cost shock which evolves exogenously f t t as Markov process, and can only take on a Önite set of values ;:::; , i.e. 1 max P = fP( j); withP( j) = 0 if 2= [ ;:::;0 0 0 ] ; 2[ ;:::; ]g; 1 max 1 max There is a market with a small number of M consumers (one can think of them as downstream Örms) who may purchase this durable good. When they buy a good, it is in brand new condition, ! = 0. In every subsequent period, the good may be damaged and thus less useful to the consumer. The di§erent quality levels that the good can t