4. From a Good Life to Human Rights Some Complications 5. Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights推荐.pdfVIP

4 From a Good Life to Human Rights Some Complications Rowan Cruft It is natural and appealing to ground human rights in their relation to the good life. Yet many people—perhaps the majority of humans across history—have suffered either from human rights violations (for example, as slaves) or at least from what we might term human rights ‘deficits’ (for example, those who live or lived in societies that restrict religious worship and political participation). It would be odd, I think, if human rights theory classified every one of these people as unable to attain a good life. While some might well have had their lives blighted by the violations suffered, not all will and some will have recovered following violation, or even found meaning in the violation itself, as a martyr for example.1 So respect for a person’s human rights can- not be necessary for that person to have a good life. In addition, many people whose human rights are recognized and respected fail to live good lives due, for example, to miserable personal relationships, thwarted ambitions or major illnesses. So respect for a person’s human rights cannot be sufficient for that person to have a good life either. Maybe respect for human rights tends to make a good life more likely, but that could be questioned. Nonetheless, it would be odd if there was no important relationship between a per- son’s human rights and their living a good life. Without such a relationship, the power and appeal of human rights would be significantly diminished. One of the virtues of Liao’s account is that it brings out clearly the complexity of the relationship between human rights and a good life, while still taking the good life as the ultimate ground for such rights. In sections I to IV that follow, I examine Liao’s account in order to show th