Experimental Economics Best Shot public goods games推荐.pdf

Modeling for explanation and prediction Starting with interesting games (carefully selected) and progressing to boring ones (randomly selected) Models of learning • We’re going to start by looking again at some games we’ve already looked at (ultimatum and market games), and one we haven’t yet talked about (best shot game), and see what we can model/explain with simple learning models. • Then we’ll think about how to compare their predictive ability with other models, including (especially) equilibrium. • A big literature has grown up on theories of fairness to explain some of the same phenomena. Loosely speaking, we might think of theories of fairness as trying to explain what happens in the first period of these games, while theories of learning are trying to explain how behavior changes with experience. 2 “Best shot” public goods game • Player 1 provides some quantity q1 • Player 2 learns q1, and provides some quantity q . 2 • This results in a quantity q of public good equal to • q = max{q , q } 1 2 • The players are paid based on a (common) payoff table, such that player j’s payoff (j=1,2) is of the form • . p = R(q) – cq . j i • That is, players are paid some (common) reward based on the amount of public good, but they are each charged for the amount qi they provided. • (The name “best shot” reflects the maximum in the formula for the amount of public good q. When it is a minimum, it’s the “weak link” game, closely related to the minimum games we played in class.)