供应链管理（英文课件）Chapter6-Supply_Contracts.ppt

* * Chapter 6: Supply Contracts * Dr. YANG Ruina * * Agenda Introduction Contracts for Strategic Components Contracts with Asymmetric Information Contracts for Nonstrategic Components * Introduction Significant increase of outsourcing -- From complete manufacturing to the design and assembly of the entire products More outsourcing has meant Search for lower cost manufacturers Development of design and manufacturing expertise by suppliers Procurement function in OEMs becomes very important OEMs have to get into contracts with suppliers For both strategic and non-strategic components * Contracts for Strategic Components Supply Contract can include the following: Pricing and volume discounts. Minimum and maximum purchase quantities. Delivery lead times. Product or material quality. Product return policies. * 2-Stage Sequential Supply Chain A buyer and a supplier. Buyer’s activities: generating a forecast determining how many units to order from the supplier placing an order to the supplier so as to optimize his own profit Purchase based on forecast of customer demand Supplier’s activities: reacting to the order placed by the buyer. Make-To-Order (MTO) policy * Swimsuit Example 2 Stages: a retailer who faces customer demand a manufacturer who produces and sells swimsuits to the retailer. Retailer Information: Summer season sale price of a swimsuit is $125 per unit. Wholesale price paid by retailer to manufacturer is $80 per unit. Salvage value after the summer season is $20 per unit Manufacturer information: Fixed production cost is $100,000 Variable production cost is $35 per unit * What Is the Optimal Order Quantity? Retailer marginal profit is the same as the marginal profit of the manufacturer, $45. Retailer’s marginal profit for selling a unit during the season, $45, is smaller than the marginal loss, $60, associated with each unit sold at the end of the season to discount stores. Optimal order quantity depends on marginal profit and marginal