中级微观课件·范里安版第28章讲义幻灯片.pptVIP

Mixed Strategies Player A So for there to exist a Nash equilibrium, Amust be indifferent between playing Up orDown; i.e. (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) L, R, U, D, Player B Mixed Strategies Player B Player A So the game’s only Nash equilibrium has Aplaying the mixed strategy (3/5, 2/5) and hasB playing the mixed strategy (3/4, 1/4). (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U, D, L, R, Mixed Strategies Player B Player A The payoffs will be (1,2) with probability (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U, D, L, R, 9/20 Mixed Strategies Player B Player A The payoffs will be (0,4) with probability (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 Mixed Strategies Player B Player A The payoffs will be (0,5) with probability (0,4) (0,5) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 6/20 (3,2) Mixed Strategies Player B Player A The payoffs will be (3,2) with probability (0,4) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 (0,5) (3,2) 6/20 2/20 Mixed Strategies Player B Player A (0,4) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 (0,5) (3,2) 6/20 2/20 Mixed Strategies Player B Player A A’s expected Nash equilibrium payoff is (0,4) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 (0,5) (3,2) 6/20 2/20 Mixed Strategies Player B Player A A’s expected Nash equilibrium payoff is B’s expected Nash equilibrium payoff is (0,4) U, D, L, R, (1,2) 9/20 3/20 (0,5) (3,2) 6/20 2/20 Mixed Strategies For games with multiple pure strategies, there also exists mixed strategies. Example: Chicken game. The probability that each player plays straight is ?. How Many Nash Equilibria? A game with a finite number of players, each with a finite number of pure strategies, has at least one Nash equilibrium. So if the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium then it must have at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. A Sequential Game Example Fight Don’t fight Enter Stay out (1,9) (1,8) (0,0) (2,1) Entrant Incumbent Incumbent Don’t fight Fight (Stay out, Fight) is a Nash equilibrium. A Sequential Game Example Fight Don’t fight Enter Stay out (1,9) (1,8) (0,0) (2,1) Entrant Incumbent Incumbent Don’t fight Fight