英文版产业经济学教程第4章价格歧视资料.pptVIP

英文版产业经济学教程第4章价格歧视资料.ppt

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英文版产业经济学教程第4章价格歧视资料

例:参考价格对高价位产品的影响 微波炉型号 选择率(%) 第一组(60人) 第二组(60人) 松下Ⅱ型 13 松下Ⅰ型 43 60 爱默生 57 27 * 4.4.3 Indirect price discrimination based on quantity quantity discount. taxi fee electric power use Package strategy(quantity—price portfolio) * (P、F)组合类型 One2one铜服务价格 One2one金服务价格 月租费 17.50英镑 36.00英镑 工作日白天通话费 29便士 18便士 英国移动通信公司的二部定价套餐 此外还有,移动的动感地带短信套餐等。 * 4.5 Comparision among several methods in nonlinear pricing Two-part tariff (T(q)= A+ pq) provides a menu of consume bundles in a line. Generally the line does not pass origin. Simplicity is its primary attraction, and sometimes it depends on possibility of limited arbitrage. Full arbitrage is prevented, namely only one buyer pays for fixed fee A, and then resale goods to other consumers. Notice:actually two-part tariff corresponds to quantity discount, average price decrease with increase of consume quantity. * Profit and welfare Assumption:consumers reference as below U= V(0)=0,V’(q)0,V’’(q)0. θ is a constant of taste, different in person. V(*) is uniform to everyone. Also these can be explained in the same preference of consumers but with different income level. Compare among case of perfect discrimination, monopoly pricing and two-part tariff. θV(q) – T if they pay T and consume q 0 if they do not buy * A simple model Two kinds of consumers, proportion of taste parameter beingθ1 is λ, proportion of taste parameter beingθ2 is 1-λ. Assume that θ2 θ1 ,monopoly produce in fixed cost c, and c θ1 θ2 . for simplicity, assume so V’(q)=1-q * Utility function Notice:fixed cost only influence the decision of buying or not. Once consumers decide to buy, it is out of consider. Consumer utility maximization:U=θiV(q)- pq First-order condition:θiV’(q) = p According to assumption before,θi(1-q) = p So , demand function is educed as q = Di(p) = 1-p/ θi Net consumer surplus is * General demand function In this case, consumer surplus is Notice that ,and θ2 typ

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