On the Tension between Moral Autonomy and the Rational Justification of Norms论道德自治与规范理性正当性的张力.pdfVIP

Ratio Juris. Vol. 16 No. 1 March 2003 (105–122) On the Tension between Moral Autonomy and the Rational Justification of Norms* JAN-R. SIECKMANN Abstract. Within the framework of autonomous morality, the validity of a norm depends on the consent of autonomous agents. However, such a consent will often not be obtained. Approximative criteria can be formulated, stating when a norm, although not consented completely, should be accepted as objectively valid. Such criteria, how- ever, restrict moral autonomy. Hence, demands of autonomy and of rationality collide. This collision must be resolved by restraining autonomous judgement in order to make commonly binding norms possible. I. Introduction The idea of moral autonomy suggests that autonomous beings have the right 1 to live according to their own moral convictions. It implies that an autonomous person must not be subjected to a norm which he or she rejects as morally wrong. Accordingly, the normative validity of a norm cannot be established without the consent of the norm addressees, if these are autonomous agents. An autonomous agent is one who is able to make moral judgements according to certain standards of reasonableness, e.g., consistency, empirical correctness, universalisation. A moral judgement or norm is one which claims correctness in an absolute sense, that is not only relative to a certain empirically defined system of norms. Normative theories based on the idea of moral autonomy raise several problems if they are connected with a claim to objective validity (Alexy 1991, * I should like to thank Ms Ruth Grace Charlton and Ms Tracy Messenger for advice on matters of the English language. 1 This conception of moral autonomy must be distinguished from autonomy as the capability to act self-determinedly, that is to have a free will, autonomy as the c