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Rating sovereign debt in a Rating
sovereign debt
monetary union – original sin by in a monetary
union
transnational governance
Finn Marten Körner 253
FSI Assurance Department, Deloitte, Düsseldorf, Germany, and
Received 24 November 2014
Hans-Michael Trautwein Revised 17 February 2015
Accepted 17 March 2015
Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that major credit rating agencies (CRAs)
have been inconsistent in assessing the implications of monetary union membership for sovereign risks.
It is frequently argued that CRAs have acted procyclically in their rating of sovereign debt in the
European Monetary Union (EMU), underestimating sovereign risk in the early years and over-rating the
lack of national monetary sovereignty since the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis. Yet, there is little
direct evidence for this so far. W
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