Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy第一章.pdfVIP

Chapter One INTRODUCTION Traditional measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the ef- fects of information and decisionmaking on combat outcomes. In the past, command, control, communications, computers, intelli- gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations have been analyzed separately using measures of performance (MOPs). Assessing the effects of improvements in C4ISR operations on com- bat outcomes has been inferred rather than directly assessed. For example, such physical improvements as greater bandwidth are gen- erally thought to be beneficial to combat operations. The same is true for improved sensors and fusion algorithms and their salutary effects on the common operating picture (COP). Even the more re- cent discussions of network-centric warfare (NCW) or network- centric operations (NCO) (Cebrowski, 1998) and information supe- riority imply that their effects will be to improve combat operations by improving decisionmaking. However, the quantifiable link be- tween these improvements in C4ISR and combat outcomes has been relatively difficult to assess. The problem has been widely recog- nized: for example, Alberts et al. (2001) state in their recent book: For many, Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare remain abstract concepts, their applicability to military operations and organizations [are] unclear, and their value unproven. Others have seen the benefits but are unable to “connect the dots” between improved information . . . and outcomes in a [scientifically] rigorous . . . way.