“塞尔问题”与解释语义学.docxVIP

“塞尔问题”与解释语义学【内容提要】“塞尔问题”即机器智能的意向性缺失难题，是心灵哲学、人工智能哲学和认知科学中的焦点问题之一。要造出真正能超出人类智能的智能，下一步就是要探讨意向性现实出现的机制与条件以及让它在机器中得以实现的方法和途径。沿着这一思路，经典计算主义在辩护基础上开始研究句法加工如何表现语义性，新生代计算主义正在崛起，联结主义作了新的回应，进化论语义学倡导研究大自然的“意向性建筑术”，解释语义学也是这一探索中所出现的一种具有个性的理论。卡明斯强调：表征并不是意向性的充分条件，而只是必要条件。要让人工智能表现出意向性，一是要让它有表征能力，二是要有社会、文化等约束因素，三是要让计算机有内在的整体结构，四是要在人工智能的研究中探讨如何让机器有内在的解释机制。解释语义学无疑为人工智能如何真正接近或超越自然智能指出了一条可能的出路。人的意向性中那种隐秘的、重要的关联能力似乎隐约地掀开了它的神秘面纱：借解释可部分实现这种关联。“Searl problem” that artificial intelligence (AI) has no intentionality is the front and focus problem in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of AI and cognitive science. It is generally recognized that to make AI really exceed human intelligence, the next step is to research conditions of intentionality actual occurrence and ways of how to achieve in machinery. Along the train of thought, classical computationalism start to study syntax how to represent semantics based on advocacy; new computationalism is rising; connectionism made a new response; evolution semantics promotes to research “art of intentionality architecture” of the nature; interpretational semantics also is a kind of theories with its own personality. R. Cummins emphasizes: representation is not sufficient condition but necessary condition for intentionality. To make AI present intentionality, four conditions are necessary. First, it must have ability of representation. Second, it must have social and cultural constraints. Third, let the computer has the overall structure of the inner. Fourth, we must study how to make machinery have internal explanation facility. Undoubtedly interpretational semantics points out a possible way to AI how to really approach or exceed the natural intelligence. That hidden and important association in human intelligence has opened the veil of mystery faintly. We can partially achieve the association by interpretation.【关 键 词】意向性/人工智能/解释/表征/计算????intentionality/artificial intelligence/interpretation/representation/computationEE48UU1697385????［中图分类号］B089.2　 ［文