产权理论与财务与会计研究.ppt

* * Juan yung * * * * Ownership and control characteristics affect accounting Not fundamental enough. Look at asset specificity. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * SYSU-minghai * Research Questions in This Study To investigate the impact of political rent seeking on corporate financing behaviors in China Research questions How do rent seeking and corruption affect capital structure, debt maturity, and long-term debt financing of the Chinese firms? In retrospect, whether political connections provide the firms financing advantages? Are the financing advantages of the politically connected firms reflected in their stock prices? Does corruption affect capital allocation efficiency? SYSU-minghai * Why China?Pervasive corruption One of the world’s highly corrupted countries According to China’s official record, during 1997-2002, there are totally 861917 corruption cases under investigation 842760 corruption cases concluded 846150 people punished by communist laws, of which 137711 expelled from the communist party Among the punished communist party members, 28996 county （县）level 2422 intermediate（厅,局）level 98 provincial （省, 部）level or above SYSU-minghai * Corruption in Asian Economies(Source: Transparency International: mean Corruption Perception Index 1992-2000) SYSU-minghai * Empirical Design Identifying 23 high (provincial) level government officer corruption cases during 1995-2003 Tracking publicly listed companies in China that are bribers or are connected with the corrupted bureaucrats Track changes in financial leverage and debt maturities of the event (bribing or connected) firms from 3 years before to 3 years after the corruption event SYSU-minghai * Empirical Design Compared with the prior studies, this single-economy time-serial empirical design provides advantages Focusing on a specific institutional factor – rent seeking Providing more directly link between corporate financing decisions with rent seeking and corruption Mitigating endoge