Algorithmic Mechanism Design univaqitunivaqit算法机制的设计.pptVIP

SECOND PART: Algorithmic Mechanism Design Implementation theory Imagine a “planner” who develops criteria for social welfare, but cannot enforce the desirable allocation directly, as he lacks information about several parameters of the situation. A mean then has to be found to “implement” such criteria. Subfield of economic theory with an engineering perspective: Designs economic mechanisms like computer scientists design algorithms, protocols, systems, … The implementation problem Given: An economic system comprising of self-interested, rational agents, which hold some secret information A system-wide goal Question: Does there exist a mechanism that can enforce (through suitable economic incentives) the selfish agents to behave in such a way that desired goal is implemented? The system-wide goal Goal: to implement desired social choices in a strategic setting Social choice: aggregation of preferences of participants towards a joint decision Why strategic setting? participants act rationally and selfishly Usually preferences of participants are private and can be used to manipulate the system Designing a Mechanism Informally, designing a mechanism means to define a game in which a desired outcome must be reached However, games induced by mechanisms are different from games in standard form: Players hold independent private values The payoff matrix is a function of these types ? each player doesn’t really know about the other players’ payoffs, but only about its one! ? Games with incomplete information MD and network protocols Large networks (e.g. Internet) are built and controlled by diverse and competitive entities Entities own different components of the network and hold private information Entities are selfish and have different preferences MD is a useful tool to design protocols working in such an environment An example: auctions Mechanism degree of freedom The mechanism has to decide: The allocation of the item (social choice) The payment by the winner …in a