4-Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders英语教案.pdf

American Finance Association Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders Author(s): William Vickrey Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1961), pp. 8-37 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the American Finance Association Stable URL: /stable/2977633 . Accessed: 17/10/2011 06:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. Blackwell Publishing and American Finance Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Finance. COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS WILLIAM VICKREY Columbia University IN HISEconomics of Control, A. P. Lerner threw out an interesting suggestion that where markets are imperfectly competitive, a state might be able to create the agency, through counterspeculation, conditions whereby the marginal conditions for efficient resource allocation could be maintained.Unfortunately, it was not made clear just how this counterspeculationwas to be carriedout, and to many this term denotes just one more of the empty boxes that rattle around in the economists cupboard of ideas. And there appears to have been, in the years since Economics of Control first appeared, no attempt to examine critically just what this intriguingly labeled box might in fact contain. In Section I this counterspe