地方政府自利性对社会保障支出效率的影响研究保险学专业论文.docx

Local government’s self-interest and the efficiency of social security expenditure Abstract Livelihoods problems have somehow hindered the Chinese continuous development. Social security is one of the most important livelihood issues, which is also a top priority of the government work. Social security is a system which provides help to the residence of one country when they are faced with plight because of aging, unemployment, serious diseases and other problems. Social security is one of the important ways for the government to realize its function. With the accumulation of national wealth, Chinese government is financially stronger to yield more into social security. Social security is a local public good, local government plays the most important role in providing it. Social security is a system constructed by every concerned government bureaus, through which expenditure on social security is transformed into social security public good. So social security expenditure efficiency is a reflection of the operation of social security system. Zero chapter is a search of foreign and home literature about social security expenditure efficiency and government’s self- interests. In the first chapter, I give the definition of the local government’s self-interests and social security expenditure efficiency. The local government is the provider of the local social security and has its own interests which are not exactly consistent with local welfare, and this fact suggests that during the implementation of the social security policy the government might purchase their own interests on the sacrifice of local welfare. The over expanding of the government, the government’s preference of public goods, and the treatment gap between the government employees and other residence are unfavorable conditions for the realization of the social security expenditure efficiency. In the second chapter, this thesis explored the internal mechanism of through which the self-interest of local