基于股权激励的上市公司盈余管理问题研究毕业论文.doc

经典文档 下载后可编辑复制 PAGE 经典文档 下载后可编辑复制 题目： 基于股权激励的上市公司盈余管理问题研究 姓名/学号 专业班级 会计学2008-2 指导教师 完成日期 2012 经济管理学院 2012 年6月 兰州 基于股权激励的上市公司盈余管理问题研究 摘 要 基于委托代理理论，股东与管理层存在利益冲突，股权激励则是促使股东与管理层利益趋于一致的有效激励机制。但在股权激励的实施过程中管理层为了自身利益最大化进行的盈余管理将会大大降低股权激励的激励效果。基于这一背景，本文在总结盈余管理与股权激励的相关理论、盈余管理的常见手段的基础上，结合我国上市公司实施股权激励的现状，分析了其中利用常见股权激励形式实施盈余管理的空间及相应经济后果，提出规避盈余管理完善股权激励方案的思路，并且结合案例分析了青岛海尔基于股权激励方案实施盈余管理的空间，最后从制度层面提出规避上市公司基于股权激励的盈余管理行为的对策建议。 关键词 上市公司 股权激励 盈余管理  Study on Earnings Management of Stock Option Incentive in Listed Companies ABSTRACT Based on the theory of principal-agent, interest conflicts exist between the shareholders and management, and equity excitation is an effective incentive method to coordinate the interests of the shareholders and the management. But in the implementation process of the equity incentive, managers use earnings \management to maximize their own interests, which greatly reduce the effects of equity incentive. On the basis of the summary about the earnings management and equity incentive theory, this paper analysis the earnings management space and the corresponding economic consequences combined with the present situation of equity incentive of the Chinas listed companies, and proposed an idea of avoiding earnings management to improve the equity incentive plan. And on the basis of case analysis Qingdao Haiers earnings management space which in the implementation process of the equity incentive. Finally, we put forward some suggestions from the systematical perspective to avoid the earnings management which was based on equity incentive. KEYWORDS Listed companies, Equity incentives, Earnings management 目 录 TOC \o 1-3 \h \z \u 1 绪论 PAGEREF _Toc327433795 \h 1 1.1 选题的背景和研究意义 PAGEREF _Toc327433796 \h 1 1.1.1 选题的背景 PAGEREF _Toc327433797 \h 1 1.1.2 研究意义 PAGEREF _Toc327433798 \h 1 1.2 国内外研究现状及分析 PAGEREF _Toc327433799 \h 2 1.2.1 国外研究现状及分析 PAGEREF _Toc327433800 \h 2 1.2.2 国内研究现状及分析 PAGEREF _Toc327433801 \h 4 1.3 论文结构及主要