股权集中行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯由我国上市公司生发.pdfVIP

资本市场 CAPITAL MARKET 股权集中、行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯： 由我国上市公司生发* The Involvement of Ownership Concentration, Industry Competition, Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance: Generated from Chinese Listed-Firms 刘 星 谢斯静 内容提要 对上市公司股权集中度、行业竞争度对薪酬业绩敏感性影响的研究发现：股权集中度与薪酬业绩敏 感性呈现倒 形关系。 当股权集中度达到较高水平，即第一大股东绝对控股后，与国有企业相比，民营企业的 U 大股东监督对薪酬业绩敏感性的替代作用更强。 在外部治理方面，行业竞争度与薪酬业绩敏感性显著正相关， 表明高竞争强度可以在一定程度上强化薪酬契约的激励作用。 关键词 股权集中 最终控制人性质 行业竞争 薪酬业绩敏感性 作者单位 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 重庆 400030 Liu Xing Xie Sijing Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of ownership concentration and industry competition on the sensibility be - tween executive compensation and corporate performance and finds that it is a reverse “U” type relationship be- tween the ownership concentration and the sensibility between executive compensation and corporate performance. When the concentration of ownership is high, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the block holder monitor- ing of private enterprises has a more significant negative effect on the sensibility between executive compensation and corporate performance. About the external governance, we find that the sensibility between executive compensa- tion and corporate performance enhances when the industry competition degree rises, which shows that high compe- tition degree can promote the exciting function of compensation contracts to a certain degree. Key words: ownership concentration, ultimate ownership, industry competition, sensibility between executive com - pensation and corporate performance 近年来，高管薪酬问题受到来自社会和政府的密切关注。在我国改革发展过 程中，经济社会的健康稳定发展、企业发展的兴衰成败与高管人员有着十分密切 的关系。 如何使企业价值提升与高管个人利益有机地结合起来一直是公司治理 领域的核心问题，解决此问题的方法