1-s2.0-S0047272707000266-main外文电子书籍.pdfVIP

Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007) 2261 – 2290 /locate/econbase ☆ Decentralization and political institutions Ruben Enikolopov a,b , Ekaterina Zhuravskaya b,c, ⁎ a Harvard University, United States b Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) at the New Economic School (NES), Russian Federation c CEPR, United Kingdom Received 5 October 2004; received in revised form 21 November 2006; accepted 8 February 2007 Available online 16 February 2007 Abstract Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests Rikers [Riker, W. (1964) “Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance,” Little, Brown and Co, Boston, MA.] theory that the results of fiscal decentralization depend on the level of countries political centralization. We analyze cross-section and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of Rikers predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Decentralization; Federalism; Political institut