公共部门经济.ppt

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Externality Chapter 4 Public Goods Chapter 4 Public Goods Chapter 5 Public Revenue Chapter 5 Public Revenue Chapter 5 Public Revenue Chapter 5 Public Revenue Chapter 6 Public Expenditure Performance. State-run industries tend to be bureaucratic. A political government may only be motivated to improve a function when its poor performance becomes politically sensitive, and such an improvement can be reversed easily by another regime. Improvements. Conversely, the government may put off improvements due to political sensitivity and special interests — even in cases of companies that are run well and better serve their customers needs. Corruption. A monopolized function is prone to corruption; decisions are made primarily for political reasons, personal gain of the decision-maker (i.e. graft), rather than economic ones. Corruption (or principal-agent issues) during the privatization process - however - can result in significant underpricing of the asset. This allows for more immediate and efficient corrupt transfer of value - not just from ongoing cash flow, but from the entire lifetime of the asset stream. Often such transfers are difficult to reverse. 4.2 Pro-privatization and anti-privatization arguments Chapter 6 Public Expenditure Accountability. Managers of privately owned companies are accountable to their owners/shareholders and to the consumer, and can only exist and thrive where needs are met. Managers of publicly owned companies are required to be more accountable to the broader community and to political stakeholders. This can reduce their ability to directly and specifically serve the needs of their customers, and can bias investment decisions away from otherwise profitable areas. Civil-liberty concerns. A